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Abstract
In cash-in-advance models, necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of
an equilibrium with zero nominal interest rates and Pareto optimal allocations place
restrictions only on the very long-run, or asymptotic, behavior of the money supply.
When these asymptotic conditions are satisﬁed, they leave the central bank with a
great deal of ﬂexibility to manage the money supply over any ﬁnite horizon. But what
happens when these asymptotic conditions fail to hold? This paper shows that the
central bank can still implement the Friedman rule if its actions are appropriately
constrained in the short run.
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Milton Friedman (1969) presents his famous rule for optimal monetary policymaking. ”Our
ﬁnal rule for the optimum quantity of money,” he writes (p.34), ”is that it will be attained
by a rate of price deﬂation that makes the nominal rate of interest equal to zero.” Friedman
also suggests that this rule can be implemented by steadily contracting the money supply at
the representative household’s rate of time preference.
Wilson (1979) and Cole and Kocherlakota (1998) assess Friedman’s proposals using fully-
speciﬁed, general equilibrium models in which money is introduced through the imposition
of a cash-in-advance constraint. These authors conﬁrm the relevance of the Friedman rule
by demonstrating that equilibrium allocations are eﬃcient if and only if the nominal interest
rate equals zero. But they also ﬁnd that the Friedman rule can be implemented through any
one from a broad class of monetary policies. Some of these policies call for the money supply
to expand over an arbitrarily long, but ﬁnite, horizon; others call for the money supply to
contract, but at a rate that is always slower than the representative household’s rate of time
preference. In fact, Wilson and Cole and Kocherlakota show that necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with zero nominal interest rates and Pareto
optimal allocations place restrictions only on the asymptotic behavior of the money supply:
these restrictions simply require the money supply to eventually contract at a rate that is
no faster than the representative household’s rate of time preference.
For central bankers who wish to implement the Friedman rule, these asymptotic condi-
tions are a double-edged sword. For when the conditions are satisﬁed, they leave the pol-
icymaker with considerable leeway in managing the money supply over any ﬁnite horizon.
1But what should the central banker do when, for some reason, these asymptotic conditions
fail to hold? Must the Friedman rule be abandoned altogether? Or is there still a way to
manage the money supply so that nominal interest rates are zero and equilibrium allocations
are eﬃcient, at least in the short run?
To answer these questions, section 2 sets up a cash-in-advance model like those used
by Wilson (1979) and Cole and Kocherlakota (1998) and, for the sake of completeness,
restates the asymptotic conditions that are both necessary and suﬃcient for implementing
the Friedman rule over the inﬁnite horizon. Section 3 then assumes that these asymptotic
conditions do not hold and characterizes optimal monetary policies in this alternative case.
Section 4 concludes by reinterpreting and extending the results of section 3 using a version
of the model in which private agents are boundedly rational in a very special way.
2 A Cash-in-Advance Model
An inﬁnitely-lived representative household is endowed with one unit of productive time





where ct denotes its consumption and 1 − nt its leisure during period t. The discount
factor satisﬁes 1 > β > 0. The single-period utility function u is strictly increasing in both
arguments, strictly concave, and twice continuously diﬀerentiable. Let ui and uij, i,j = 1,2,





2It will be useful in what follows to assume that V is strictly decreasing with limy→0 V (y) = ∞
and limy→1 V (y) = 0. Since uis strictly increasing and concave, a suﬃcient condition for
V 0(y) < 0 is u12 ≥ 0.
The household enters period t with money Mt and bonds Bt. The goods market opens
ﬁrst; here, the description of production and trade draws on Lucas’ (1980) interpretation
of the cash-in-advance model. Suppose that the representative household consists of two
members: a shopper and a worker. The shopper purchases consumption from workers from




Meanwhile, the worker produces output according to the linear technology yt = nt and sells
this output to shoppers from other households for Ptnt units of money.
The asset market opens last. In this end-of-period asset market, the representative
household receives a lump-sum nominal transfer Ht from the central bank and the household’s
bonds mature, providing Bt additional units of money. The household spends Bt+1/(1 + rt)
on new bonds, where rt is the net nominal interest rate, and carries Mt+1 units of money
into period t + 1. The household’s budget constraint is therefore
Mt + Ht + Bt
Pt
+ nt ≥ ct +
Bt+1/(1 + rt) + Mt+1
Pt
.
In addition to the cash-in-advance and budget constraints, the household’s choices must
satisfy the nonnegativity constraints
ct ≥ 0, 1 ≥ nt ≥ 0, Mt+1 ≥ 0.
3And while the household is allowed to borrow by choosing negative values of Bt+1, it is not
permitted to borrow more than it can ever repay. Let Qt denote the present discounted value
in the period-0 asset market of one unit of money received in the period-t asset market, so


















Qs(Hs + Psns) ≥ 0.
Thus, the representative household chooses {ct,nt,Mt+1,Bt+1}∞
t=0 to maximize its utility
subject to the cash-in-advance constraint, the budget constraint, the nonnegativity con-
straints, and the no-Ponzi-game constraint, each of which must hold for all t = 0,1,2,....
The appendix shows that when the market-clearing conditions
yt = ct = nt, Mt+1 = Mt + Ht, Bt+1 = 0
are imposed, necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a solution to the household’s problem
can be written as
u1(yt,1 − yt) = λt + µt, (1)






























where λt and µt are Lagrange multipliers on the period-t budget and cash-in-advance con-
straints. Accordingly, an equilibrium can be deﬁned as a set of sequences {yt,λt,µt,rt,Pt,Mt+1}∞
t=0
that satisfy (1)-(6), with the initial condition M0 pinned down by a choice of nominal units.
Under the maintained assumptions on the household’s utility function, there is a unique
symmetric Pareto optimal allocation for this economy. This allocation has yt = y∗ for all
t = 0,1,2,..., where y∗ is the unique value that satisﬁes the eﬃciency condition V (y∗) = 1:
the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption equals the corresponding
marginal rate of transformation. What monetary policies, deﬁned as sequences {Mt+1}∞
t=0,
allow for the existence of an equilibrium in which allocations are Pareto optimal? To an-
swer this question, Wilson (1979) and Cole and Kocherlakota (1998) obtain results like the
following.
Proposition 1 An equilibrium with yt = y∗ for all t = 0,1,2,... exists if and only if
inf
t β
−tMt > 0 (7)
and
lim
t→∞Mt+1 = 0. (8)
Proof To begin, suppose that (7) and (8) are satisﬁed, and set yt = y∗, λt = u1(y∗,1−y∗) =
u2(y∗,1 − y∗), µt = 0, rt = 0, and Pt = βtP0 for all t = 0,1,2,..., where P0 > 0 is




5for all t = 0,1,2,.... But (7) guarantees the existence of an ε > 0 such that β−tMt ≥ ε
for all t = 0,1,2,..., and thereby allows this last condition to be satisﬁed for any choice
of P0 ≤ ε/y∗. Meanwhile, (8) guarantees that (6) will hold. Thus, (7) and (8) are
suﬃcient conditions for the existence of an optimal equilibrium.
Next, suppose that an equilibrium with yt = y∗ for all t = 0,1,2,... exists. By (1)-(4),
λt = u1(y∗,1 − y∗) = u2(y∗,1 − y∗), µt = 0, rt = 0, and Pt = βtP0 > 0 for all




for all t = 0,1,2,..., which implies that (7) must be satisﬁed. Meanwhile (6) implies
that (8) must hold. This establishes that (7) and (8) are also necessary conditions for
the existence of an optimal equilibrium, completing the proof.
Proposition 1 and its proof support Friedman’s (1969) assertion that Pareto optimal
allocations are associated with price deﬂation and zero nominal interest rates. Friedman also
suggests that his zero-nominal-interest-rate rule can be implemented by steadily contracting
the money supply at the representative household’s rate of time preference and, indeed, the
policy that sets Mt = βtM0 for all t = 0,1,2,... satisﬁes both (7) and (8). As emphasized by
Wilson (1979) and Cole and Kocherlakota (1998), however, many other monetary policies
also satisfy (7) and (8), including ones that call for positive rates of money growth over
arbitrarily long, but ﬁnite, horizons, and ones that set Mt = γtM0, with 1 > γ ≥ β, for all
t = 0,1,2,....
In fact, (7) and (8) impose restrictions only on the very long-run behavior of the money
6supply. Condition (7) places a lower bound on the asymptotic money growth rate: since
the gross inﬂation rate equals β under the Friedman rule, the money stock must eventually
grow at a rate that is at least as large as β if the cash-in-advance constraint is not to
become binding. Condition (8) places an upper bound on the asymptotic money growth
rate: evidently, the money supply must eventually contract if the nominal interest rate is
to remain at zero. Together, therefore, (7) and (8) simply require the money supply to
asymptotically contract at a rate no faster than the household’s rate of time preference.
3 Implementing the Friedman Rule in the Short Run
When (7) and (8) hold, they leave the central bank with a great deal of ﬂexibility; in fact,
they allow the central bank to choose any time path for the money supply over any ﬁnite
horizon while still implementing the Friedman rule. But what is a central banker to do when
(7) or (8) fails to hold?
When (7) fails to hold, the money supply contracts asymptotically at a rate that exceeds
the representative household’s rate of time preference. A second result, also adapted from
Cole and Kocherlakota (1998), is useful in considering this case.
Proposition 2 Let the single-period utility function take the form
u(c,1 − n) = ln(c) + v(1 − n),
where v is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice continuously diﬀerentiable
with limn→1 v0(1 − n) = ∞. If Mt+1/Mt < β for all t = 0,1,2,..., then no equilibrium
exists.
7Proof When Mt+1/Mt < β for all t = 0,1,2,..., (7) fails to hold. Hence, by proposition
1, there is no equilibrium with yt = y∗ for all t = 0,1,2,.... So suppose there is an
equilibrium with yt = ˜ y 6= y∗ for some t. Equations (1), (2), and (5) then imply
1
˜ y
= λt + µt ≥ λt = v
0(1 − ˜ y),
a condition that, along with the concavity of v, rules out the possibility that ˜ y > y∗.
Hence, any such equilibrium must have yt = ˜ y < y∗ and µt > 0. But in this case, (5)












or, more simply, Mt+1/Mt ≥ β. But this contradicts the original assumption that
Mt+1/Mt < β for all t = 0,1,2,...; evidently, no equilibrium exists.
Proposition 2 suggests that when (7) fails to hold, the problem has to do with the
possible nonexistence of an equilibrium, rather than merely the suboptimality of equilibrium
allocations. What happens when a central bank adopts a policy that is inconsistent with
the existence of an equilibrium? Exploring the subtleties of this issue is left for future
research; instead, the remainder of this paper will focus on the case in which the conditions
of proposition 1 are violated because (8) fails to hold.
Suppose, for example, that a central banker is appointed at the beginning of period 0 and
granted the authority to choose {Ht}
T−1
t=0 , the monetary transfers for the ﬁrst T periods. With
the initial condition M0 taken as given, this central banker’s control over {Ht}
T−1
t=0 provides
him or her with control over {Mt+1}
T−1
t=0 , the time path for the money supply through the
beginning of period T.
8This central banker’s term lasts only T periods, however: during period T, a new central
banker takes over and arbitrarily decides that the money supply will grow at the constant
gross rate π ≥ 1, so that MT+j = πjMT for all j = 0,1,2,.... Under the maintained
assumptions on the household’s utility function, there is a unique steady-state equilibrium
under the constant money growth rate π, in which output yt and real balances mt = Mt/Pt
are both constant and equal to ¯ y, where ¯ y < y∗ is the unique value that satisﬁes V (¯ y) = π/β.
So suppose in addition that, independent of the ﬁrst central banker’s decisions, yT+j =
mT+j = ¯ y for all j = 0,1,2,....
The assumption that π ≥ 1 implies that (8) will not hold when the ﬁrst central banker
takes oﬃce at the beginning of period 0. The question now becomes: can this ﬁrst central
banker, through an appropriate choice of {Mt+1}
T−1
t=0 , nevertheless guarantee the existence of
an equilibrium in which nominal interest rates are zero and allocations are eﬃcient, at least
in the short run?
As a ﬁrst step in answering this question, note that with MT+j = πjMT and yT+j =
mT+j = ¯ y for all j = 0,1,2,..., (1)-(5) are satisﬁed for all t = T,T+1,T+2,... and (6) is satis-
ﬁed as well. Hence, the values of concern to the ﬁrst central banker, {yt,λt,µt,rt,Pt,Mt+1}
T−1
t=0 ,











βu2(¯ y,1 − ¯ y)
MT/¯ y
, (10)
where these last two conditions correspond to (3) and (4) for t = T −1 and make use of the
fact that in the ineﬃcient steady state, λT = u2(¯ y,1−¯ y), µT = u1(¯ y,1−¯ y)−u2(¯ y,1−¯ y) > 0,
9and mT = MT/PT = ¯ y. These observations are useful in establishing the following.
Proposition 3 Suppose that MT+j = πjMT, with π ≥ 1, for all j = 0,1,2,... and that from
period T forward, the economy is in its unique steady state, with yT+j = mT+j = ¯ y for
all j = 0,1,2,.... Then an equilibrium with yt = y∗ for all t = 0,1,...,T − 1 exists if
and only if






βTu1(¯ y,1 − ¯ y)¯ y

MT (12)
for all t = 0,1,...,T − 1.
Proof To begin, suppose that (11) and (12) are satisﬁed, and set yt = y∗, λt = u1(y∗,1 −





βTu1(¯ y,1 − ¯ y)¯ y

MT
for all t = 0,1,...,T − 1. In addition, set rt = 0 for all t = 0,1,...,T − 2, and set
rT−1 = V (¯ y) − 1. Equation (11) guarantees that Pt > 0 for all t = 0,1,...,T − 1,
as required for the existence of this equilibrium. Clearly, (1) and (2) hold for all
t = 0,1,...,T − 1 and, since Pt+1 = βPt, (3) and (4) hold for all t = 0,1,...,T − 2.





βTu1(¯ y,1 − ¯ y)¯ y

MT
for all t = 0,1,...,T − 1, but this last condition coincides with (12) and is therefore
guaranteed to hold. Thus, (11) and (12) are suﬃcient conditions for the existence of
an equilibrium with yt = y∗ for all t = 0,1,...,T − 1.
10Next, suppose that an equilibrium with yt = y∗ for all t = 0,1,...,T − 1 exists. By (1)-(3)





βTu1(¯ y,1 − ¯ y)¯ y

MT > 0
for all t = 0,1,...,T − 1in any such equilibrium; this last condition implies that (11)





βTu1(¯ y,1 − ¯ y)¯ y

MT
for all t = 0,1,...,T − 1, but this condition simply says that (12) must hold. This
establishes that (11) and (12) are also necessary conditions for the existence of an
equilibrium with yt = y∗ for all t = 0,1,...,T − 1, completing the proof.
Before going on to interpret conditions (11) and (12), it is useful to note that proposition
3 holds much more generally. In particular, the assumption that the economy is in a steady
state from period T forward is not essential. All that is required is that the monetary policy
adopted from period T forward give rise to an equilibrium in which the cash-in-advance
constraint binds in period T, so that MT/PT = yT for some yT < y∗. In the more general
case, the proof goes through unchanged, with yT in place of ¯ y. As stated, however, the
proposition makes clear that optimal allocations can be achieved in periods t = 0,1,...,T −1
even when the rate of money growth is positive for all t = T,T +1,T +2,..., even when the
cash-in-advance constraint binds for all t = T,T +1,T +2,..., and even when allocations are
suboptimal for all t = T,T + 1,T + 2,....
Proposition 3 implies that the Friedman rule need not be abandoned when (8) fails to
hold: the central bank can still select {Mt+1}
T−1
t=0 in a way that guarantees the existence of an
11equilibrium in which the nominal interest rate is zero for all t = 0,1,...,T −2 and allocations
are eﬃcient for all t = 0,1,...,T − 1. Condition (11) simply insures that money is always in
positive supply, given that (12) must hold for all t = 0,1,...,T −1 and that Mt+1 = πMt for
all t = T,T + 1,T + 2,.... Condition (12), in turn, places upper and lower bounds on the
growth rate of the money supply and thereby provides ﬁnite-horizon analogs to (7) and (8).
Consider (12) for t = 0. Since the initial condition M0 is given, this constraint places an
upper bound on MT:

βTu1(¯ y,1 − ¯ y)¯ y
u1(y∗,1 − y∗)y∗

M0 ≥ MT. (13)
Thus, like (8), (12) implies that money growth must be suﬃciently slow if the nominal
interest rate is to remain at zero. Given a choice of MT that satisﬁes (13), (12) also places
lower bounds on Mt, t = 1,2,...,T −1. Thus, like (7), (12) implies that money growth must
be suﬃciently large if the cash-in-advance constraint is not to become binding.
Conditions (11) and (12) still leave the central bank with a great deal of ﬂexibility in
choosing its policy: the money supply can expand for the ﬁrst T − 1 periods, for instance,
so long as it eventually contracts so that (13) holds. Unlike (7) and (8), however, (11) and
(12) do constrain the money supply over a ﬁnite horizon. Thus, proposition 3 implies that
the central bank must act in the short run in order to implement the Friedman rule in the
short run.
4 Interpretation as Limited Forecast Equilibria
Extending the example from the previous section, suppose that the central banker at period
0 announces a policy {Mt+1}
T−1
t=0 that satisﬁes the conditions of proposition 3 and thereby
12succeeds in giving rise to an equilibrium with r0 = 0 and y0 = y∗. But now, suppose that
at the beginning of period 1, the representative household discovers that this ﬁrst central
banker will also be permitted to choose MT+1 and thereby delay by one period the economy’s
convergence to its ineﬃcient steady state. And suppose further that this scenario repeats
itself over the inﬁnite horizon: at the beginning of each period t = 0,1,2,..., the household
believes that the money supply {Mt+j}T
j=1 over the next T periods will be chosen by the
benevolent central banker and that the money supply will grow at the constant gross rate
π ≥ 1 thereafter. In this case, the representative household behaves like the boundedly
rational players in Jehiel’s (1998) game-theoretic framework, having perfect foresight over
the ﬁrst T periods but having what might be considered vague, and in this case incorrect,
beliefs about what will happen beyond this limited forecast horizon.
The logic used to prove proposition 3 now implies that the central bank can guarantee
the existence of an equilibrium with rt = 0 and yt = y∗ for all t = 0,1,2,... by choosing
{Mt+1}
T−1
t=0 at the beginning of period 0 to satisfy (11) and (12) and by choosing Mt+T > 0






βTu1(¯ y,1 − ¯ y)¯ y

Mt+T (14)
for all j = 0,1,...,T − 1.
Thus, when the representative household is boundedly rational in this very special way,
the Friedman rule can be implemented over the inﬁnite horizon by any policy {Mt+1}∞
t=0
that satisﬁes Mt+1 > 0 and (14) for all t = 0,1,2,.... Like (12), but unlike (7) and (8), (14)
places constraints on the short-run behavior of the money supply. Once again, therefore, the
13central bank must act in the short run to implement the Friedman rule.
It should be noted, however, that the boundedly rational household in this example does
not learn: it continues to believe that the economy will eventually move to its ineﬃcient
steady state, even though this steady state is never reached. What monetary policies will
implement the Friedman rule in environments where private agents’ expectations gradually
change in response to the observed actions of the central bank? This is another question for
future research.
5 Appendix
This appendix shows how (1)-(6) in the text can be derived from conditions that are both
necessary and suﬃcient for a solution to the representative household’s optimization prob-
lem. Since the household’s utility function is strictly concave, the necessary conditions for
optimality include the usual ﬁrst-order conditions, which are given by
u1(ct,1 − nt) = λt + µt, (A.1)













Mt + Ht + Bt
Pt
+ nt = ct +














14for all t = 0,1,2,..., where λt and µt are Lagrange multipliers on the period-t budget and
cash-in-advance constraints.










To derive (A.7), note ﬁrst that the sequence {Wt+1}∞
t=0 is nonincreasing since, using the
period-t budget constraint,












− Qt(Ht + Ptnt)
≤ −QtPtct − (Qt−1 − Qt)Mt.
In any equilibrium, Pt > 0, ct ≥ 0, Mt ≥ 0, and Qt−1 ≥ Qt > 0 must hold; it therefore
follows from the expression above that Wt+1 ≤ Wt must also hold.
Next, note that if {ct,nt,Mt+1,Bt+1}∞
t=0 solve the household’s problem, the implied se-
quence {Wt+1}∞
t=0 must satisfy inft Wt+1 = 0. To see this, suppose to the contrary that there
exists an ε > 0 such that Wt+1 ≥ ε for all t = 0,1,2,... and construct alternative sequences
{˜ ct, ˜ nt, ˜ Mt+1, ˜ Bt+1}∞
t=0 that coincide with {ct,nt,Mt+1,Bt+1}∞
t=0 except for




˜ M1 = M1 + ε,
and
˜ Bt+1 = Bt+1 −
ε
Qt+1
for all t = 0,1,2,.... These alternative sequences satisfy all of the cash-in-advance, budget,
nonnegativity, and no-Ponzi-game constraints and provide the household with a higher level
15of utility than the original sequences, which contradicts the assumption that the original
sequences are optimal. Thus, inft Wt+1 = 0 must hold.
Together, {Wt+1}∞
t=0 nonincreasing and inft Wt+1 = 0 imply that (A.7) must hold and
that, more generally, the ﬁrst-order and transversality conditions are necessary for optimality.
It is also possible to show that the ﬁrst-order and transversality conditions are suﬃcient
for optimality. Suppose that {ct,nt,Mt+1,Bt+1}∞
t=0 satisfy (A.1)-(A.7) but that {˜ ct, ˜ nt, ˜ Mt+1, ˜ Bt+1}∞
t=0


























˜ Mt − Mt
Pt
+
˜ Bt − Bt
Pt
−
˜ Mt+1 − Mt+1
Pt
−














βTλT(MT+1 − ˜ MT+1)
PT
+




































by concavity, by the ﬁrst-order conditions for ct and nt, by the budget constraint, the cash-in-
advance constraint, and the complementary slackness condition, by the ﬁrst-order conditions
for Mt+1 and Bt+1, by the ﬁrst-order conditions for Mt+1 and Bt+1 again, by the transversality
16condition, and by the no-Ponzi-game constraint. But all of this contradicts the assumption
that {˜ ct, ˜ nt, ˜ Mt+1, ˜ Bt+1}∞
t=0 yield a higher level of utility than {ct,nt,Mt+1,Bt+1}∞
t=0.
Thus, (A.1)-(A.7) are both necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a solution to the house-
hold’s problem. After the market-clearing conditions are imposed, these equations can be
rewritten as (1)-(6) in the text.
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